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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
NORMAN RILEY and ROBIN RILEY, 










SPIRAL BUTTE DEVELOPMENT, LLC, ) 
an Oregon Limited Liability Company; ) 
JIM HORKLEY, an individual; and ) 




Case No. CV-08-145 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the 
Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho 
in and for Madison County 
Honorable Darren B. Simpson, District Judge, Presiding 
Michael J. Whyte, Esq. 
Attorney for Appellants 
Thomsen Stephens Law Offices 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Ronald L. Swafford, Esq. 
Attorney for Respondent 
Swafford Law Office 
525 Ninth Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a complicated real property transaction between the parties that began 
in October of 2001. Plaintiffs Riley had been involved in a complicated bankruptcy beginning in 
2001. In an attempt to redeem real property sold during the bankruptcy, Riley borrowed money 
from Defendants Jim Horkley (hereinafter "Horkley") and Spiral Butte Development, LLC 
(hereinafter Spiral Butte). As part of the agreement for the loan of this money, Horkley and/or 
Spiral Butte were deeded the real property and leased it back to Rileys. Contained within that 
lease was an option allowing the Rileys to purchase the property back from Horkley and Spiral 
Butte. Shortly after the parties reached this lease with an option to purchase, the parties agreed 
that a third party would take over the lease of the property for the term. Prior to the end of the 
lease term and in compliance with the option to purchase, Riley's notified Horkley and Spiral 
Butte that they intended to purchase the property. This request was denied by Horkley and Spiral 
Butte. Rileys filed their complaint on February 20, 2008 alleging breach of contract and 
requesting specific performance. An amended complaint was filed on December 28, 2009. On 
February 17, 2012 Horkley and Spiral Butte filed for summary judgment. This motion was 
granted by the District Court on April 23, 2012. Rileys filed this appeal on May 31, 2012. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs Riley are farmers residing in Madison County. In 2001, the Rileys were forced 
to file bankruptcy. As part of this bankruptcy Rileys' real property was sold, but Rileys retained 
a right ofredemption for the real property. R. Vol. I, p. 167. Rileys' sought the assistance of 
Horkley to redeem this real property. R. Vol. I, p. 168. In October 2022, Rileys and Horkley 
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reached an agreement wherein Horkley' s money was used to redeem this property for Rileys. 
Horkley at some point transferred the real property to Spiral Butte. On October 25, 2002, 
Plaintiffs entered into a Lease Option Agreement with Spiral Butte. R. Vol. I, pp. 170-181; 183. 
Contained within this Lease Option were the terms that Rileys would lease the property for five 
years, and at the conclusion of this lease term they would have the opportunity to purchase the 
property from Mr. Horkley and Spiral Butte Development, LLC. R. Vol. I, p. 177. Shortly after 
the execution of the Lease Option Agreement, Rileys and Horkley agreed that a third party, 
Howard Jensen and Mark Jensen would take over the farm operation of that property until 
Plaintiffs were able to farm themselves. R. Vol. I, pp. 169, 184; 189. Section 9 of the Lease 
Option Agreement allowed Rileys to assign this lease. R. Vol. I, pp. 169, 172. Pursuant to 
Section 9 of the Lease Option Agreement, and the agreement of the parties, Howard Jensen and 
Mark Jensen farmed the property through the fall of 2007 R. Vol. I, p. 190. 
At the conclusion of the lease term, Rileys advised Horkley and Spiral Butte that they 
planned to purchase the property. R. Vol. I, p. 139. In response to this request, Horkley and 
Spiral Butte took the position that Rileys were in default of the agreement. R. Vol. I, p. 141. 
Rileys filed their lawsuit seeking specific performance of the contract on February 20, 
2008. R. Vol. I. P. 5. Horkley and Spiral Butte filed an answer denying the claims contained in 
the complaint. R. Vol. I, p. 31. An Amended Complaint was filed on December 28, 2009. On 
April 23, 2012, the District Court granted Horkley and Spiral Butte's motion for summary 
judgment. R. Vol. I, p. 223. 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the plaintiffs/appellants raised material issues of fact with regard to the 
alleged breach of the purchase option contained in the Lease Option Agreement; 
2. If there was a separate oral lease, whether the Court correctly determined that the 
oral lease did not survive the Statute of Frauds; 
3. Whether the district court correctly concluded that there was an oral lease 
agreement separate and apart from the Lease Option Agreement; 
ARGUMENT 
1. SUMMARY JUDGEMENT WAS NOT APPROPRIATE IN THAT THE 
RlLEYS RAlSED MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT WITH REGARD TO 
HORKLEY/SPIRAL BUTTE'S CLAIM THAT RILEYS BREACHED LEASE 
OPTION AGREEMENT 
The District Court in the underlying action granted summary judgment to Respondents 
holding that there were no issues of material fact. When reviewing a ruling on a summary 
judgment motion, the Appellate Court applies the same standard used by the district court. 
Summary judgment is appropriate 'if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law.' I.R.C.P. 56( c ). The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue 
of material fact is on the moving party. Van, 147 Idaho at 556, 212 P.3d at 986." 
citing Van v. Portneuf Med Ctr., 147 Idaho 552, 556, 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009). 
This Court will construe the record in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion for summary judgment, drawing all reasonable inferences in 
that party's favor. Id Summary judgment is improper 'ifreasonable persons 
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could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence 
presented.' McPhetersv. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 394, 64 P.3d 317, 320 (2003). 
However, a 'mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not 
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for the purposes of summary 
judgment.' Van, 147 Idaho at 556, 212 P.3d at 986. 
Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 890 (2010) 
The District Court granted summary judgment to Horkley and Spiral Butte Defendants 
stating that Rileys did not raise material issues of fact because they did not show that they abided 
by the terms of the Agreement. R. Vol. I, p. 233. Specifically, the District Court determined 
that the Rileys never personally paid any rental payments, purchased any insurance, paid 
electrical bills, maintain payments on the existing irrigation "circles" or paid taxes. R. Vol. I, p. 
233. However, the District Court erred in its finding that there were no issues of material fact 
that Rileys complied with the lease terms through the agreed to have Howard and Mark Jensen 
take over the farming of the property. Horkley testified that the parties agreed the Jensens would 
take over the farm operation until the Rileys were able to. This included payments. R. Vol. I, 
pp. 169, 184, 189. Having the Jensens take over the farm operation was consistent with Section 
9 of the Lease Option Agreement allowing the assignment of the lease terms. When Horkley 
testified that Jensen would take over the farm operation until the Rileys were able to, Horkley 
believed that Rileys were maintaining an interest in the property including the option to purchase 
the property at the end of the lease term. The property was farmed for the entirety of the lease 
period under this agreement. This creates a sufficient material issues of fact to survive summary 
judgment. 
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2. THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING IHA T THE ORAL AGREEMENT 
DID NOT SURVIVE THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
The District Court held that the oral lease agreement was unenforceable because it 
violated the State of Frauds. Under the Idaho Statute of Frauds, in order for a contract or 
agreement involving the lease ofreal property for a term greater than one (1) year to be 
enforceable, there must be some writing signed by the party against whom the agreement is 
meant to be enforced. Idaho Code §§9-503 and 9-505. However, the Statute of Frauds does not 
apply to an agreement that has been partially performed. Idaho Code §9-504. "So long as partial 
performance has occurred under the contract, the trial court had the discretion to compel specific 
performance, despite the lack of written evidence of the parties' agreement." Jolley v. Clay, 103 
Idaho 171, 177, 646 P.2d 413, 419 (1982). 
In granting summary judgment to Horkley and Spiral Butte, the District Court focused on 
the oral agreement between Horkley and third party Jensens. The District held that the 
agreement between Horkley and Jensens could not be enforceable against Horkley. However, the 
focus should have been on the agreement between Rileys and Horkley. It is undisputed that 
Rileys and Horkley had a written, enforceable lease agreement. When both parties became aware 
that the Rileys would not be able to actually farm the property, instead of terminating the written 
lease agreement, Horkley and Rileys entered into an oral agreement that Jensens would take over 
the written lease until Rileys were able to begin farming. R. Vol. I, pp. 169, 184, 189. This oral 
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agreement was either a separate oral agreement or an oral modification of the original written 
lease agreement. 
If it is viewed as a separate oral agreement, it is enforceable against Horkley because of 
partial performance. As indicated in both Idaho Code §9-504 and Jolley, partial performance of 
an oral contract pulls the oral contract out of the Statute of Frauds. Horkley and Riley orally 
agreed to have Jensen farm the property until Rileys could get back on the property. Horkley and 
Riley proceeded under that agreement with Jensen to complete the terms. This partial 
performance survives the Statute of Frauds and it was error for the District Court to dismiss the 
amended complaint on summary judgment. 
If, on the other hand the oral agreement between Horkley and the Rileys is determined to 
be an oral modification of the existing written lease agreement, it is still enforceable as against 
Horkley. Parties to a contract can agree to modify the contract. A modification can be implied 
by a course of conduct. "Consent to a modification of a prior written contract may be implied 
from a course of conduct consistent with the asserted modification. Ore-Ida Potato Products, 
Inc. v. Larsen, supra at 296, 362 P.2d 384. The question of whether an alleged oral modification 
was proven by 'clear and convincing' evidence is one for the trier of the facts to decide in the 
first instance." Resource Engineering Inc. v. Silver, 94 Idaho, 935, 938, 500 P.2d 836,(1972). 
Horkley and the Rileys orally modified the written lease agreement when they met and decided to 
have Jensen farm the property. After that oral agreement, Horkley and the Rileys proceeded with 
the agreement. The parties, by their actions in having Jensens farm the property, orally modified 
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the written lease agreement. By have the J ensens farm the property, by agreement, there was no 
abandonment of the property to trigger a violation of the lease. The parties actions created 
material issues of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment. 
3. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDED THAT THERE WAS A.~ 
ORAL LEASE AGREEMENT SEPARATE AND APART FROM THE LEASE 
OPTION AGREEMENT 
The District Court held that summary judgment was warranted because there was a 
separate oral lease agreement between Horkley and Jensens separate from the Lease Option 
Agreement. The parties agree that shortly after the written Lease Option Agreement, that Jensen 
would take over the farming of the property. The District Court determined that this was a 
separate oral agreement from the agreements between Horkley and the Rileys that could not be 
enforced against Horkley. The District Court erred in holding that this was a separate agreement 
and that the Rileys could not validate that agreement. As outlined in the previous section, the 
agreement between Horkley and the Rileys is the controlling agreement. When Horkley and the 
Rileys orally decided that Jensen would farm the property it was a modification of the existing 
written lease agreement. It is not the separate agreement between Jensen and Horkley that the 
Rileys are seeking to enforce. It is the agreements between Horkley and the Rileys that are being 
enforced. Horkley and the Rileys agreed to have Jensen farm the property until the Rileys were 
in a position to take over. All parties agree this was the sequence of events, and the parties 
proceeded under those events. Horkley and the Rileys were not relying on any agreement with 
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Jensen before proceeding under the terms of the original written Lease Option Agreement. 
Sufficient issues of material fact have been raised to survive summary judgment and it was error 
for the District Court to tie enforcement on an separate agreement not between the parties at bar. 
CONCLUSION 
There remain genuine issues of material facts regarding completion of the lease terms 
sufficient to withstand summary judgment and it was error for the District Court to dismiss the 
amended complaint. 
DATED this ti day of October, 2012 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofidaho, resident of and 
with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the l ~-day of October, 2012, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to be served upon the following persons 
at the addresses below their names either by depositing said document in the United States mail 
with the correct postage thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth 
below. 
MJW:tlh 
RONALD L SW AFFORD ESQ 
SW AFFORD LAW OFFICE 
525 NINTH STREET 
IDAHO FALLS ID 83404 
J:\data\MJW\6525\PLEADINGS\Appeal Breif.wpd 
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